Why Bart De Wever resists using frozen Russian assets?

Belgium sits at the center of Europe’s debate over how to use frozen Russian state assets to support Ukraine. Prime Minister Bart De Wever is not arguing for Moscow. He is arguing about law, liability, and the safety of Belgium’s financial plumbing. The short version is simple: he wants other capitals to share the legal and financial risks in writing before Belgium signs off on an ambitious loan or seizure scheme that relies on assets held in Brussels.

source - European Parliament

The legal question

International and European lawyers have warned that central bank property enjoys strong protection, and that even using the proceeds generated while the assets are immobilized raises complex questions. The European Parliament’s research service has catalogued the options and their limits , which is one reason Brussels lawyers keep asking for watertight texts and not just political promises.

Reuters reported that De Wever asked fellow EU leaders to sign guarantees so Belgium would not stand alone if courts strike down the plan or if Russia retaliates. That report is here:

Why Belgium feels exposed

The largest single pool of the frozen assets in the European Union sits at Euroclear in Brussels: around 180 billion Euros. Euroclear is a core market utility. Problems that hit it do not stay local.

When most of the operational and litigation risk lands in one member state, the political instinct of that state is predictable. Belgium wants an EU signature on risk sharing before it agrees to anything that could put its national infrastructure in the legal crosshairs.

The money and the optics

While the assets sit frozen, they earn interest and create what the EU calls extraordinary revenues. Parliament papers estimate several billion euro per year. The plan already in force channels the bulk of those proceeds to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility.

Critics answer that Euroclear has booked large sanction‑related profits since 2022 and that Belgium has collected tax on them. Civil society sources put the figure for profits over the first two years at more than five billion euro, with a headline 25 percent Belgian tax rate, although not all of that accrues as net revenue to the Belgian budget.

According to the Financial Times , several partners accuse Belgium of enjoying the revenue while slowing a bolder move that would mobilize the principal or use it as collateral. Belgium replies that it already supports directing the proceeds to Ukraine, and that the argument today is about legal cover and burden sharing for the next step.

EU politics and the demand for signatures

Euronews described the Belgian position as sceptical but constructive. The message is consistent: Belgium can back a larger Ukraine package once there is maximum legal certainty and a clear split of liabilities.

In practical terms, De Wever is asking for written commitments so that any future court loss, countersanction, or compensation claim does not fall on Belgium alone. This is not an academic worry. The country that hosts the assets will be the first address on any lawsuit.

What this adds up to

Call it risk management rather than obstruction. Belgium is not saying never. It is saying: put the guarantees on paper, distribute the risk across the coalition, and write the law in a way that survives court scrutiny. You may agree or disagree with that balance, but the motivations are traceable to concrete legal exposure, a uniquely Belgian concentration of operational risk at Euroclear, sensitive budget optics, and coalition politics inside the European Union.